The Iran-Contra Affair was an extremely important event in American history and politics. The Iran Contra Affair was the exposure of the Reagan Administration’s illegal arms sales to Iran, the profits of which were illegally funneled to anti-communist rebels in Nicaragua (Sorrentino et al., 2021). The affair is firmly situated in Cold War and Latin American U.S. strategy. Many senior officials were implicated in the affair, yet no one was held accountable; some convictions were overturned by federal courts and other potential investigations stopped by a presidential pardon (Sorrentino et al., 2021). The discoveries of the affair have permeated American life, its implications still ring, especially when discussing the power of the President and of the executive branch. Iran-Contra is a widely discussed topic among scholars; this discussion extends beyond the traditional lenses of politics explored by political scientists to other fields including historians.
One such historian is Alan McPherson, who is a professor of history at Temple University specializing in Latin American studies and foreign policy. McPherson gives a holistic and historical run down of the events of the Iran-Contra affair, including both the context in which the Reagan Administration found themselves in prior to their illegal operation and the results of the numerous investigations and criminal proceedings that followed (McPherson, 2025). McPherson’s central argument is that the affair was the culmination of many years of erosion to democratic principles and that the trial itself brought concerns too to those principles (McPherson, 2025). McPherson brings to attention the Unitary Executive Theory and its importance to the Reagan Administration. Comparing the Iran-Contra Affair to the Nixon impeachment, Republicans in Congress remained loyal to their president and prevented serious action against the administration such as impeachment proceedings (McPherson, 2025, 109-110). The unitary executive theory—sometimes referred to as the imperial presidency theory—posits that the President has absolute authority over the executive branch, to fire any and all employees at his will regardless of the meritorious system or bureaucratic independence; this theory discounts historic claims of independence among executive branches like the Department of Justice (McPherson, 2025, 101).
Other historians have examined the affair through different theories. Bruce Hicks was a professor of history at Cumberland College, now known as the University of the Cumberlands. Despite being a historian, his article was published in a political science journal. Hicks, like McPherson, refers to the “imperial presidency” and classifies it similarly to McPherson (Hicks, 1996, 964). Hicks breaks down the Iran-Contra affair into two separate areas: support for the Contras and selling weapons to Iran (Hicks, 1996, 965). While engaging in this examination, Hicks incorporates the theories of the imperial presidency and another theory known as congressional co-determination—that Congress and the President work jointly on foreign policy—Hicks rejects this model (Hicks, 1996, 965). Differing from McPherson, Hicks engages in a more historiographical review of the theories involved here, presenting the views of different scholars. Ultimately, McPherson falls into the imperial president camp and justifies the affair using that theory (Hicks, 1996, 971-972).
One final publication approaches this topic in a similar fashion. James McCormick is a professor of Political Science at Iowa State University who has authored many pieces on Congress and foreign policy, having previously worked as an APSA Congressional Fellow. Stephen Smith is a senior fellow of governmental studies at the Brookings Institute specializing in policy leadership. McCormick and Smith’s publication provides a political science analysis of the Iran-Contra affair in the moment of its revelation in the context of past events, most importantly, the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 (McCormick and Smith, 1987). Taking on a political science examination of the affair, differing from McPherson, McCormick and Smith contextualize the affair starting with the events of the 60s and 70s, particularly the Church Committee Hearings and unsavory actions by the CIA in that period (McCormick and Smith, 1987, 30). In their examination, the authors go through several instances where the president would be required to disclose covert operations. The authors take a position on the prerogatives of each branch, saying that each branch must be sure to stay in its lane and not exceed its powers; that Congress should be careful to not step too much on the executive’s toes (McCormick and Smith, 1987, 34). The position of the authors in this piece seems to refute the theory of congressional co-determination, as Hicks does. McCormick and Smith’s conclusion is that the Reagan Administration did violate the 1980 Act, focusing especially on the damage done to public opinion and government credibility (McCormick and Smith, 1987, 35-36).
In examining the Iran-Contra Affair, each source constructs a distinct narrative about the meaning and causes of the scandal. McPherson presents the affair as the product of a long-term erosion of democratic norms and the rise of an increasingly unchecked executive branch, emphasizing the loyalty shown to Reagan and the broader implications of the unitary executive theory. Hicks, while similarly engaging with the idea of the “imperial presidency,” approaches the topic through a historiographical lens, comparing competing theories of foreign policy power and ultimately situating the affair within a debate over presidential dominance in foreign affairs. McCormick and Smith frame the scandal primarily as an institutional and constitutional conflict, focusing on oversight, the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, and the practical tensions between Congress and the executive branch. Together, these works demonstrate that the Iran-Contra Affair can be understood through multiple narratives: as evidence of democratic decline, as a case study in theories of presidential power, and as a constitutional struggle over the limits of executive authority.
Sources
Hicks, Bruce D. “Presidential Foreign Policy Prerogative After the Iran-Contra Affair: A Review Essay.” Presidential Studies Quarterly, 26, no. 4 (1996): 962-977. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27551664.
McCormick, James and Stephen S. Smith. “The Iran Arms Sale and the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980.” PS: Political Science & Politics, 20, no. 1 (1987): 29-37. https://doi.org/10.2307/419267.
McPherson, Alan. 2025. ‘”Two Visions of Government’: Iran-Contra and the Congressional Debate Over American Democracy.” The Journal of American History (2025). https://rave.ohiolink.edu/ejournals/article/441742764.
Sorrentino, Frank M., Michael A. Genovese, and Alison D. Howard. “Iran-Contra Affair” in Encyclopedia of the American Presidency. 4th ed. Facts On File (2021). https://access.infobase.com/article/1672616-iran-contra-affair?aid=239116&brand=credo